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Fiscal centralisation in a federal state: the South 
African case
E. Calitz & H. Essop
6A B S T R A C T
15The paper seeks to determine whether the observation from a 
constitutional law and public administration perspective, namely that 
a distinct centralist tendency has become evident in South Africa in 
recent years, in terms of legislation, policy and practice of government, 
is borne out by an empirical analysis of fi scal data. An overview of 
key legislative, policy and operational changes is combined with an 
investigation of trends of indicators pertaining to intergovernmental 
fi scal relations. It is established that the South African fi scal scene 
has, over many decades, been characterised by a steady and gradual 
reduction of the fi scal autonomy of sub-national governments. Fiscally, 
South Africa has become more centralised, thus strengthening the de 
facto erosion of the federal state.
16Key words: structure of government, intergovernmental fi scal relations, fi scal centralisation, 
fi scal decentralisation, public economics, sub-national government, local government, local 
fi scal autonomy, intergovernmental fi scal relations in South Africa
We do not have democracy [in Russia] for the simple fact that no functioning self-government 
has [yet] been established. Local party bosses continue to call the tune at the lower administra-
tion level. Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, Russian Nobel laureate 1994 (Hoffschulte 2008: 114)
Introduction
1Political (de)centralisation is not necessarily equivalent to or an accurate indicator 
of fiscal (de)centralisation. Scottish devolution shows, for example, that substantial 
political decentralisation might take place without fiscal decentralisation (Garrett & 
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Rodden (2001: 3). China, conversely, is an example of significant fiscal decentralisation 
and strong political centralisation (see Zhang 2006). 
The South African Constitution, Act 106 of 1996 (RSA 1996) determines as follows 
regarding the authorities of and relationship between the three tiers of government 
(Malherbe 2008b: 54): 
• Government is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government 
that are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated (Section 40(1)).
• Functional areas of concurrent national and provincial legislative competence 
and exclusive provincial legislative competence are listed in Schedules 4 and 5, 
respectively.
• A municipality has executive authority in respect of matters listed in Part B of 
Schedule 4 and Part B of Schedule 5; and any other matter assigned to it by 
national or provincial legislation (Section 156(1)). Municipalities also have the 
authority to impose rates, taxes and surcharges (Thornhill 2008: 73).
There are clear differences of interpretation as to whether and to what extent 
the Constitution establishes a federal or a unitary state. Ajam and Aron (2007: 749) 
describe the result of the South African Constitution as a complete restructuring 
into a unitary state with three spheres of government: national, nine provincial 
governments and 283 local municipalities (down from 784 in the apartheid era), 
coupled with the creation of a fiscally decentralised system of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations. By contrast, De Villiers (2008b: 2) speaks of a “federal-type dispensation”. 
Malherbe (2008a: 19), also recognising the federal properties, provides yet another 
description, namely that the Constitution provides that South Africa is a so-called 
composite state with at least three particular federal features: the constitutionally 
entrenched distribution of powers between the national and provincial spheres; 
the power of the judiciary (specifically the Constitutional Court) to adjudicate 
jurisdictional disputes between these spheres; and the right of provinces to enact 
their own constitutions, the Western Cape being the only province functioning under 
its own constitution (Malherbe 2008a: 20). In addition, the White Paper on Local 
Government 1998 (RSA 1998) reflects the acceptance of local government (as distinct 
from provincial government) as a sphere of government in its own right, no longer 
viewed as subordinate to provincial and national government (Thornhill 2008: 64).
Malherbe (2008b: 46–50) argues that the de facto position with regard to provinces 
differs significantly from the de jure constitutional arrangement and that, fuelled 
mainly by political and ideological reasons, a “distinct centralist tendency has become 
evident in South Africa over the past decade”. Evidence of this includes: 
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• the shifting of welfare payment administration from provincial to national 
government;
• the transfer of social security administration to a national agency;
• the indicated shift of Further Education and Training (FET) colleges from 
provinces to the national Department of Higher Education and Training;
• increased expenditure norms and standards enforced on the provincial expenditure 
side;
• the non-activation of income tax sharing and fuel levies as provincial revenue 
sources; 
• the remark in the policy review of provincial and local government undertaken 
by the South African national Department of Provincial and Local Government1 
that provincial administrations were amalgamated to become “a single public 
service with national government departments” (De Villiers 2009b: 132); 
• the abolishment of the local government regional service levy and the subsequent 
establishment of a nationally collected and allocated local-government share in 
the fuel levy; 
• the prospective new composition of regional electricity distributors, which is likely 
to remove the electricity surcharge as a source of local government revenue; and
• the effective possible removal of the health function from provincial governments 
as implied by the recommendation in the Green Paper on National Health 
Insurance, namely that the public health system be centralised under the control 
of a “national fund” (under a chief executive appointed by the Minister of Health) 
with regional offices (Van den Heever 2011: 5).
Two examples of centralisation attempts that were blocked by the Constitutional 
Court are the objection by the Western Cape province to national legislation that 
sought to regulate liquor licensing, an exclusive provincial competency, and the 
Premier of KwaZulu-Natal’s resistance to the intention to regulate gambling 
nationally (Fessha & Kirkby 2008: 263).  
Although few and far between, there is evidence of increased decentralisation at 
the local government level: for metros there has been increased decentralisation in 
the form of expenditure assignment (devolution of human settlements and public 
transport functions) and decreased conditionality in grants (e.g. the Municipal 
Infrastructure Grant), whilst potentially new sources of revenue (e.g. a local business 
tax) have been under consideration.
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Purpose and methodology
1The purpose of this paper is to determine whether the centralisation observations 
from a constitutional law and public administration perspective, as reflected, 
respectively, in Malherbe (2008a 2008b) and Thornhill (2008), are borne out by 
empirical analysis of fiscal data. Our main finding is that, over a long time period, 
intergovernmental fiscal relations in South Africa have become more centralised and 
this fiscal centralisation appears to strengthen the de facto erosion of the federal state.
We combine an overview of key legislative, policy and operational changes with 
an investigation of fiscal trends. We use the databases of the South African Reserve 
Bank (SARB) (national accounting statistics and government finance statistics), 
data obtained from the SARB’s Occasional Papers series, and National Treasury 
data on intergovernmental transfers and aspects of local government finance (see 
Annexure  1). Throughout we use the term “sub-national” to refer to all non-national 
(or non-central) government activities as classified in national accounting terms under 
the heading of general government. We deliberately avoid the debate on devolution 
versus decentralisation and use the latter term throughout, but we realise that we 
nonetheless remain vulnerable to all the confusion about the meaning of the concept 
of decentralisation, as pointed out by Schneider (2003: 34–35). Our focus is on fiscal 
(de)centralisation, although we will also refer to aspects that may be classified as 
administrative and political (de)centralisation, to use the distinction by Schneider 
(2003: 33).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section gives a brief 
overview of international experience and theoretical considerations regarding fiscal 
(de)centralisation, which is followed by an indication of the kind of empirical work 
on decentralisation found in the literature, and then empirical evidence of the South 
African trend since 1973 is given, before the conclusion. 
International experience and theoretical considerations2
1Globally, the history and experimentation of countries with fiscal (de)centralisation 
portrays a pendulum of continual search for the right balance between the 
centralisation and decentralisation of the delivery and financing of government 
services, that is, of seeking the optimal level of centralisation (or decentralisation). 
In recent times, globalisation appears to have had contradictory effects on the 
choice of the centralisation–decentralisation mix. Trade benefits associated with 
globalisation and the uneven regional distribution within a country of benefits and 
costs of trade liberalisation tend to favour centralisation. By contrast, the strengthening 
of democracy in a globalised world, where decision-making is increasingly – through 
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economic integration – elevated to higher spheres of government, is seen as being ever 
more dependent on the strengthening of and participation in local decision-making 
(see for example Hoffschulte 2008). The idea that local (sub-national) government 
constitutes a separate sphere of government gained formal international recognition 
in March 1999, when the representation of local authorities was institutionalised in 
the organs of the United Nations (UN) (Hoffschulte 2008: 112). In so doing, the UN 
broke with the earlier assumption that sub-national tiers of political responsibility 
are automatically accounted for when interacting with national governments.
Indicators provide strong evidence of increasing fiscal decentralisation in a majority 
of countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
during the past three decades. Multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, 
United Nations and OECD actively support fiscal decentralisation in developing 
countries and East European transformation countries to promote economic and 
social development, and efficiency and transparency in the public sector (Stegarescu 
2005). Since 1990, the world has actually witnessed strong movements towards 
decentralisation and/or secession, such as in Argentina, Colombia, Ethiopia, the 
republics of the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, India, Czechoslovakia, Canada, 
Belgium, Italy and Spain (Panizza 1999: 97–98). 
By contrast, Germany was reunified, and the European Union is the most 
prominent example of the establishment of economic and monetary union, embodying 
a dimension of fiscal centralisation. The latter, which came under the most intensive 
scrutiny and review in the aftermath of the international financial crisis of 2007–
2009, had to do with the responsibility towards and accountability for macroeconomic 
stability and is not necessarily in contradiction of more decentralisation on allocative 
efficiency grounds.
Nonetheless, the on-going European financial crisis is a good example of the threat 
to regionalisation of delinquent decentralised fiscal sovereignty. Clearly, political 
considerations of how best to deal with divided societies or how best to build new 
societies tend to play a bigger role than pure economic considerations in determining 
the extent of (de)centralisation. The recent South African political experience is a 
case in point. In a survey of six African countries (including South Africa), Fessha 
& Kirkby (2008: 264) conclude that “the prevailing trend of sub-national autonomy 
in many African states is to reinforce central authority at the expense of democracy, 
development and accommodation of diversity”.
The efficiency and equity arguments underpinning the debate about the 
appropriate centralisation–decentralistion mix are well documented in most public 
finance textbooks (see, for example, Ajam 2011) and need not be outlined here, save 
for mentioning a few key points pertinent to this analysis. An important point of 
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reference, which explains the rationale for decentralisation and why this entails the 
strengthening of democracy, is the principle of subsidiarity. This is the idea that a 
central authority should have a subsidiary function, performing only those tasks that 
cannot be performed effectively at a more immediate or local level.3
The classic argument for maximising local discretion is most closely associated with 
Wallace Oates (1972, 1977), the argument being that the greatest allocative efficiency 
is achieved when budgetary choices are made by local officials elected by local people 
who have to meet the full cost of their decisions through local taxes. Decentralisation on 
the grounds of technical efficiency is based on the alleged reduction in organisational 
costs (i.e. mobility and signalling cost) and the benefits of vertical and horizontal 
competition between jurisdictions (see, for example, Panizza 1999: 98). 
Arguments in support of centralisation are derived from considerations of technical 
efficiency (i.e. economies of scale and lower administrative and coordination cost), 
equity (in the sense of nation-wide redistribution of resources), externalities across 
borders of sub-national jurisdictions and, of course, macroeconomic stabilisation.
Revenue assignment on the basis of benefit taxation favours local taxes or revenues. 
The ability-to-pay approach and the associated redistribution function, as well as 
efficiency of tax collection, the mobility of tax bases across regional boundaries and 
macroeconomic stabilisation considerations, suggest taxation at a higher level (i.e. 
national level). Most countries’ revenue assignment corresponds to Musgrave’s (1983) 
guidelines.
Revenue shortfalls, given revenue assignments and the expenditure mandates 
(assignments) of sub-national governments, are addressed through conditional or 
unconditional transfers from higher to lower tiers of government. Borrowing powers 
are conditional upon debt-service ability and congruence with macroeconomic 
stabilisation policies.
Types of empirical work on fi scal decentralisation
1Empirical work on fiscal federalism include: the development of appropriate 
indicators and the measurement of local discretion – for example, Stegarescu (2005); 
OECD (1999); and Libman (2009) on the Russian Federation; time-series and cross-
sectional regression analyses with a view to determining the statistically significant 
and economically plausible explanatory variables (e.g. Panizza 1998); as well as 
studies of the impact of fiscal decentralisation on economic and productivity growth 
and inequality – for example, by Zhang (2006) for China, and Meloche, Vaillancourt 
& Yilmaz (2004) for European transition economies; on the size of government (as in 
Ehdaie 1994), or on macroeconomic stability (as in Shah 2005).
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Panizza’s (1999: 111) analysis of data on 55 countries confirms the finding of 
Oates that country size and income per capita are negatively correlated with fiscal 
centralisation. In addition, he finds that democracy and ethnic fractionalisation are 
negatively correlated with fiscal centralisation, but they have unstable coefficients, 
highly dependent on the sample used (Panizza 1999: 123).
Initial economic structures and conditions are an important factor in the measure 
of fiscal autonomy of sub-national governments, as pointed out by Zhang (2006: 713) 
with regard to China and implied by Schoeman (2006) about South Africa.
Our focus is on identifying indicators of fiscal decentralisation and measuring 
the extent. We follow Stegarescu (2005: 304) in viewing a system where sub-national 
levels of government have real autonomy to determine the allocation of their 
expenditure or to raise their own revenue as more decentralised than another system 
where local or regional government spending and revenue are determined by national 
legislation, even though the formal assignment of functions or revenues might be the 
same for both systems. Stegarescu (2005: 312) points out that in federal countries, 
local government taxes are regulated by regional or state legislation, without the 
involvement of the central government.
The correct specification of indicators and their correct measurement are obviously 
decisive for conclusions on trends. Stegarescu has, for example, constructed new 
data for a number of OECD countries by adjusting local tax revenue for tax-raising 
powers. One of his results was that, in the case of federal countries such as Austria 
and Germany, sub-national governments have only limited autonomy over taxation. 
Consequently, a drastically lower degree of decentralisation was measured than 
when unadjusted revenue statistics were used. In fact,  he shows that some federal 
countries appear to be more centralised than unitary countries such as Denmark and 
France, while federal states such as Switzerland, Canada and the USA are among the 
most decentralised countries (Stegarescu 2005: 315).4
Public finance data do not properly reflect true decentralisation. Many years ago, 
Oates (1972), among others, had already pointed to the limitations of using budgetary 
shares. The share of sub-national government expenditure or revenue in consolidated 
general government expenditure or revenue is nonetheless still widely used as a proxy 
for the degree of decentralisation of the public sector. These measures have various 
shortcomings (Stegarescu 2005: 302). An increase in sub-national expenditure does 
not distinguish between an increase in volume (i.e. more of the same service), new 
services rendered on behalf of or dictated by a higher tier of government (which 
may not reflect an increase in decentralised discretion) and new services decided 
on by discretion of the particular sub-national government (which would be true 
decentralisation). Likewise, an increase in sub-national government revenue does 
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not necessarily reflect more autonomy (i.e. an increase in decentralisation). Such 
revenue could represent conditional transfers, tax sharing or tax revenue governed 
and administered by national government laws – a problem of vertical decision-
making structures. A clear distinction should therefore be drawn between the 
measurement of the size of a tier of government, reflecting total expenditure or 
revenue at that level, and the measurement of the extent of independent discretion or 
decentralised authority, reflecting independence or autonomy of decision-making and 
accountability to a distinguishable and clearly defined sub-national constituency of tax-
paying beneficiaries to whom the authority is eventually accountable. The ratio between 
transfer income from a higher level of government and the total revenue of a sub-
national authority could thus be referred to as the grant dependency ratio. The lower 
this ratio is, the higher the fiscal independence of autonomy.
Because of the above-mentioned complications, various other alternative measures 
of (de)centralisation have been used, such as the ratio of sub-national government 
employment to total government employment, the population-normalised number of 
sub-national jurisdictions and even the number of tiers of sub-national government 
(as listed by Stegarescu 2005: 306). None of these seem to overcome the above-
mentioned problems and will not receive attention here.
Table 1:  Classifi cation of sub-national taxes, in decreasing order of control over revenue 
sources (or of tax autonomy)
mxiiiAutonomy rank
mxiv[(1)=highest)]
mxvNature of SNG tax authority
mxvi(1) mxviiSNG determines tax rate and tax base
mxviii(2) mxixSNG determines tax rate only
mxx(3) mxxiSNG determines tax base only
mxxii(4) mxxiiiTax sharing:
mxxiv(4.1) mxxvSNG determines revenue split
mxxvi(4.2)
mxxviiRevenue split only changed with 
consent of SNG
mxxviii(4.3)
mxxixRevenue split unilaterally changed by 
NG (legislation)
mxxx(4.4)
mxxxiRevenue split unilaterally changed by 
NG (annual budget)
mxxxii(5) mxxxiiiNG determines tax rate and tax base
mxxxivNote:      SNG is sub-national government; NG is national government.
mxxxvSource: OECD (1999: 11)
Stegarescu (2005: 307) identifies three factors with a view to classifying sub-national 
taxes in decreasing order of fiscal autonomy: legislative competencies to determine 
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the tax base and tax rate, the attribution of tax receipts, and tax administration. In his 
definition, only taxes that can be chosen independently, and over which sub-national 
levels of government have their own legislative and administrative powers, ensure 
complete financial autonomy. Based on an OECD (1999) investigation, Table  1 
contains a classification of declining tax autonomy as used by Stegarescu. 
The least subjective method of determining the extent of tax autonomy is given by 
the following formula:
 
mxxxviSNG own tax revenue
mxxxviiGG total tax revenue
where SNG = sub-national government and GG = general government. 
This corresponds to (1) in Table 1. As one moves down the list in Table 1, the 
indicators present increasingly weaker degrees of sub-national autonomy. Our 
analysis of South African trends will inter alia be with reference to this table.
Empirical evidence regarding fi scal (de)centralisation in South 
Africa since 1973
1During the apartheid era, several regional governments were created with varied 
powers to govern, spend and tax. In order to capture a period of major sub-national 
governmental change, our analysis pertains to the period since 1973, just before the 
first region (Transkei) was given independent state status in 1976. With the advent 
of democracy in 1994, the Constitution required the reintegration of apartheid-
defined independent and self-governing states into a single new state with nine 
provinces. Revenue-raising powers under the Constitution have remained highly 
centralised, however. Not only do the new provinces have limited taxing power, but 
the Constitution (section 228) (RSA 1996) also determines that these powers must 
be regulated by an act of the national Parliament. The same applies to the provinces’ 
share in nationally collected revenue, which is transferred in terms of a special 
division of the annual revenue act of the national Parliament. 
Additionally, the most productive taxes, such as value-added tax (VAT), personal 
and corporate income tax, are reserved for the national government. Provincial 
governments collect very little own revenue (Section 228 of the Constitution), and 
the income raised within the province typically amounts to less than 5% of the 
provincial budget, thus institutionalising huge unfunded mandates5 and dependence 
on transfers from national government. The Constitution confirms the historical 
authority of local government to impose rates on property and surcharges on fees 
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for services provided by or on behalf of the municipality (e.g. for electricity or 
sewerage). Both provinces and local governments have borrowing powers, but only to 
finance capital expenditure and not for current expenditure. Moreover, the national 
government does not guarantee sub-national loans (for more detail, see Aron & Ajam 
2007: 750–751; Ajam 2011).
In a factor analysis of three types of decentralisation (fiscal, administrative and 
political), using 1996 data from 66 countries, Schneider (2003) puts South Africa in 
position number 19 for fiscal decentralisation (which measured sub-national revenue 
and expenditure as percentages of total government revenue and expenditure, 
respectively – in other words the very indicator that Oates advised against), number 63 
for administrative decentralisation (a measurement corresponding with the criterion 
of sub-national tax autonomy) and number 10 for political decentralisation (which 
measures the occurrence of sub-national elections). In terms of the measures of fiscal 
and political decentralisation, South Africa has a more decentralised system than 
almost all the developing and transition economies in the sample, a position entirely 
lost in respect of administrative decentralisation, which comes closest to indicator (1) 
in Table 1.
Malherbe (2008b: 48–52) mentions several reasons why the South African 
Constitution “does not authorise the degree of centralisation we now experience”, 
such as the various ways in which the national government’s top-down style of 
management manifests, and the acute problem of sub-national capacity to manage 
the allocated functions and resources effectively (see also Smoke 2000: 29). The key 
point, however, is whether a lack of capacity is seen as something to be remedied 
by building capacity or solved by centralisation. The centralisation risk is no better 
illustrated than by former President Mbeki’s response during the 2004 election 
campaign when, after hearing from residents about poor municipal service quality, 
he remarked that “it may have been a mistake to give local government all the 
responsibilities they have” (Steytler 2005: 208). 
The above observations are borne out by a number of developments that over 
the years have added to the perception (if not reality) of fiscal centralisation. Data 
presented by Van Waasdijk (1964: 62) serve as a historical reference point. The 
average shares of the three tiers of government in total government revenue for the 
period 1959–1962 were as follows: national government (70.6%), provinces (9.6%) 
and local authorities (19.8%). Municipalities and other local authorities, with their 
property tax and access to user charges in respect of services, were financially largely 
self-sufficient, although much of their capital expenditure was subject to approval by 
the Treasury or Provincial Administration (see Van Waasdijk 1964: 60–62).
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Van Waasdijk (1964: 100–119) and others, such as Browne (1983) and Calitz, Du 
Plessis & Siebrits (2009), have previously discussed the major changes in the state of 
responsibilities and revenue sources of sub-national government since the early 1960s. 
As a result, several conclusions can be drawn regarding fiscal (de)centralisation in 
the provincial government sphere. Firstly, the reduction in financial independence 
of provinces, which had already surrendered their share in national company tax as 
a revenue source in 1957, continued during the second half of the previous century 
with the abolition in 1971 of provincial income tax. 
Secondly, during the period 1975–1994, the apartheid experiment of independent 
and self-governing states entailed the empowerment of these regional authorities 
with more tax powers. In fact, all the normal national taxes were at the disposal 
of the four “independent” states, even though their tax bases were so small that 
major transfers from the South African government were continuing. Within South 
Africa – as defined during the time of apartheid – the four provincial governments 
continued to experience dwindling decentralised autonomy, which manifested inter 
alia in the replacement in 1986 of elected provincial councils with executive councils. 
Thirdly, the 1996 Constitution, by which the different apartheid regional 
governments were consolidated and restructured, in the form of the present nine 
provinces, provided for new provincial tax sources, notably income tax sharing and fuel 
levies, thus raising prospects of stronger provincial financial self-sufficiency. These 
tax sources are not out of line with, for example, Musgrave’s assignment guidelines. 
However, such new provincial taxes have not been implemented, with the de facto 
situation showing a continuation of the pre-1994 pattern: for example, the envisaged 
implementation of a fuel levy in the Western Cape (Brown 2007) was not approved 
by the National Treasury, and a local government share in the national fuel levy was 
instituted instead (National Treasury 2008: 70). The irony is that, immediately after 
the Western Cape provincial government’s attempt failed, National Treasury raised 
the national fuel levy by R0.50 country-wide to substitute for the Regional Services 
Council (RSC) levies at municipalities, notably the metros.
Even though the RSC levies were replaced by a fuel tax sharing dispensation, the 
local government sphere has experienced less erosion of autonomy than provinces over 
time. However, the poor revenue bases and capacity constraints that characterised 
many local authorities before 1994 did not disappear with the re-demarcation 
and concomitant rationalisation of municipalities after 1994. In the metropolitan 
municipalities (category A) and some of the local municipalities (category B) that 
were financially stronger, some of these deficiencies could be absorbed in the form of a 
redistributional obligation imposed on local government as developmental institutions 
(see Steytler 2005: 190). However, poor service, low revenue bases and capacity 
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constraints still characterise many municipalities, threatening decentralisation 
unless an asymmetric approach is followed with sufficient accommodation and 
support for municipalities to graduate towards increased self-standing financial 
status.6 Nonetheless, there appears to be a smaller difference between de facto and de 
jure decentralisation with regard to local government than provincial government.
Against this background of events and incidents, we now turn to an analysis of 
fiscal data to determine fiscal centralisation tendencies at both provincial and local 
government levels. We proceed with a description of the data before utilising several 
key (de)centralisation measures, as noted in Table 1, to determine whether South 
Africa has seen any clear trend towards becoming more or less fiscally centralised.
Data and methodology
1The data employed in the analysis that follows were obtained from the South African 
Reserve Bank’s (SARB) Quarterly Bulletin for several of the variables used in this 
paper. The underlying method and structure of public accounts data (and indeed 
national accounts) were changed over time (see De Clerck 2003), but neither Statistics 
South Africa (StatsSA) nor the SARB has officially reconstructed the public accounts 
data prior to 1992 on the basis of the latest method and structure. Consequently, we 
had to construct a unified series utilising other sources for data prior to 1992.
The SARB did, however, publish a paper that provides public-sector accounts data 
from 1973 to 1990 (SARB 1991), which represents an attempt to address the lack of 
historical data, albeit with unofficial data. It is believed that these two data sets are 
comparable, as the underlying methodologies are based on the International Monetary 
Fund’s (IMF) Manual on Government of Finance Statistics (GFS). Consequently, the 
constructed series and results can be interpreted as if both data sets form a single 
complete set of data. However, if differences in the data sets cannot be reconciled, 
the resulting trends from each data set have to be interpreted separately. This is 
discussed in more detail following Figure 1. For purposes of clarity, we refer to the 
data described here as Data Set 1 (DS1).
As noted earlier, several indicators – listed as (a) to (f) in Table 2 – have been used 
in the literature to measure fiscal (de)centralisation. 
The tax coverage ratio (e) is considered a strict measure of fiscal centralisation 
and comes closest to indicator (1) in Table 1. However, we regard indicators (b) and 
(c) in Table 2 as reflecting the size of operations rather than the extent of autonomy. 
Also note that, in the case of the total revenue ratio – (b) in Table 2) – high levels 
of transfers from national government would bias the SNG total revenue figures as 
indicators of fiscal decentralisation. Instead of the seemingly greater fiscal discretion, 
Fiscal centralisation in a federal state: the South African case
143 
large transfers actually indicate exactly the opposite, namely greater dependency of 
SNG on national government. Consequently indicators (b) and (c) in Table 2 are not 
measured in this paper. 
Table 2: Formulae for fi scal (de)centralisation indicators
mxxxviiiIndicator mxxxixFormula
mxl(a)
mxliSNG own tax revenue as % of total CGG tax 
revenue (tax revenue ratio)
mxliiSNG own tax revenue
mxliiiCGG total tax revenue
mxliv(b)





mxlixSNG expenditure as % of total CGG expenditure 
(total expenditure ratio)
mlSNG own current expenditure
mliCGG total current expenditure
mlii(d)




mlvi(e) mlviiTax-expenditure coverage ratio
mlviiiSNG own tax revenue
mlixSNG total current expenditure
mlx(f) mlxiTax-wage coverage ratio
mlxiiSNG own tax revenue
mlxiiiSNG wage bill
mlxivNote: SNG is sub-national government; CGG is consolidated general government.
Instead, we suggest three additional indicators to measure the extent of sub-
national autonomy. First, the grant dependency ratio (d) reflects the extent to which 
sub-national government is dependent on grants for revenue purposes. Next, the tax 
coverage ratio with respect to total expenditure reflects the ability of sub-national 
government to finance their expenditures with their own tax revenue. Under a 
balanced budget, the grant dependency ratio and the tax-expenditure coverage ratio 
are mirror images. The third indicator is the tax-wage coverage ratio (f), that is, the 
ability of SNG to fund salaries and wages with own tax revenue. This implicitly 
assumes that SNG pays wages before spending on any other item is considered.
In the next section, we utilise DS1 to construct the indicator (a) shown in Table  2 
for the period 1973 to 1990, and 1992 to 2008, as well as indicators (d), (e) and (f). 
Note that DS1 does not contain data for 1991. The lack of data for 1991 is represented 
by a dashed line, assuming a linear trend between the 1990 and 1992 data points. 
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Results
1As shown by Stegarescu (2005) and others, the tax ratio of sub-national to general 
government is considered the strictest (purest) measure of sub-national autonomy. 
An increasing (a decreasing) ratio indicates increased (decreased) fiscal autonomy. 
Figure 1 presents the sub-national (provincial and local government) tax ratio for 
South Africa.
We link the data series on provincial government up to 1990 (excluding Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei, generally referred to as the TBVC states), 
and after 1992 (in respect of the post-apartheid South Africa, which includes the 
revenues previously attributed to TBVC states) with a dashed line in Figure 1. The 
bulge in the period between 1990 and 1994 is attributed to the fact that the TBVC 
states were allowed to levy taxes7 that provinces could not. Notwithstanding the 
inability to generate an integrated series, it is clear that the declining trend prior to 
1990 continued after 1994, on balance indicating deteriorating fiscal autonomy for 
provincial government for the entire period under consideration. For the period 2003 
to 2008, the provincial tax revenue ratio appears to stabilise at below 1%, far below 
the peak of almost 8% if the TBVC states were to be included during the apartheid 
years, as well as below the 3% provinces-only ratio of 1973. Note that the 1973 ratio 
was already far below the 9.6% average of 1959–1962, as reported earlier.
When the tax ratio for local government is considered, as shown in Figure 1, 
the results are somewhat ambiguous. For the period 1973 to 1990, there is a clear 
downward trend, implying reduced fiscal autonomy. However, this could also be a 
result of the campaign of non-payment for services launched against the then national 
government during the apartheid era. Then, with the inclusion of the TBVC states in 
the data post-1992, the number of local governments increased, which partly explains 
the increase from 1990 to 1992. After 1992, local government fiscal autonomy, as 
represented by the tax ratio, fluctuates around a mean of approximately 6%, and in 
recent years shows a substantial decline from 6.4% in 2004 to 4.1% in 2011. (Note 
that this ratio averaged 19.8% during 1959–1962, as reported by Van Waasdijk [1964: 
62]). The latter dip can in part be attributed to the removal by National Treasury of 
RSC levies as a local government revenue source, but another factor is that arrears 
on municipal rates have recently become a major problem. Despite an apparent 
improvement in recent years, in December 2010 outstanding debtors stood at 30% of 
local government own revenue (National Treasury 2011: 61).
Unlike the provincial tax ratios, the local government tax ratios in Figure 1 did 
not quickly revert to the levels expected following the reincorporation of the TBVC 
states and the accompanying municipalities. The two trend lines in Figure 1 show 
that after the spike in the tax ratio for provinces and local government in 1991–1992, 
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the trend line for local government fell much more slowly. A possible explanation is 
the reduction in revenue sources for local government noted above, which occurred 
with a lag. Another possible reason concerns the incorporation of data for local 
government in the former TBVC states after 1993. This raised the trend line above 
what it would have been if only non-TBVC local governments were included. In 
this sense, the important difference compared to the provincial trend line is that, 
after 1993, the revenue ratios pertaining to provinces were reduced because of the 
immediate reduction in revenue sources such as income and indirect taxes that 
accompanied the reincorporation of the TBVC states.
1
Note:       CGG is consolidated general government.
Source: Own calculations based on SARB (1991) and SARB Quarterly Bulletin data
Figure 1:  Tax ratio: tax revenue as a percentage of consolidated general government tax revenue, 
by type of SNG (1973–1990, 1992–2011)
1In summary, the SNG tax ratio clearly indicates decreasing fiscal autonomy for 
provincial government for the period 1973 to 2011, even if the two data sets are 
considered non-comparable. Furthermore, the current tax ratio levels appear to have 
stabilised at less than 1% since the late 1990s. For local government, the result is 
less clear: we observe a decreasing trend from 1973 to 1990, fluctuations around a 
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higher level from 1992 to 2006, and a subsequent sharp decline. This decline has 
been mitigated somewhat by an increase in the tax ratio to over 4% for 2010 and 2011.
Figure 2 presents the grant dependency ratio (indicator (d) in Table 2), which 
measures the extent to which SNG is dependent on grants (or transfers) from national 
government to finance their activities. 
1
Note:      SNG is sub-national government.
Source: Own calculations based on SARB (1991) and SARB Quarterly Bulletin data. 
Figure 2:  Grant dependency ratio: grant revenue as a percentage of total revenue, by type of SNG 
(1973–1990, 1992–2011)
1For the period 1973 to 1990, this ratio was just below 90%, but it increased to 97% by 
2011, leaving no doubt as to the provinces’ high and increasing dependence on grant 
revenue. The corresponding figures for the combination of provincial governments 
and TBVC states for the 1973 to 1990 period also showed a decline between 1973 
and 1990, as would be expected given the TBVC states’ tax ability, as noted earlier. 
However, even when these additional revenue sources are considered, the provincial 
governments and TBVC states combined at best still received 70% of their revenue 
from grants. Despite the share of tax revenue collected nationally, to which SNGs 
are entitled in the form of block grants, such a high level of dependency on national 
government for funds does nothing to change the view of a highly fiscally centralised 
system as far as the provinces are concerned.
Local government seems less dependent on grant revenue than provincial 
government, but has also become more dependent on national government since the 
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1970s, and again from 2000 onwards, with the grant dependency ratio increasing 
steeply and peaking at 31% in 2010. 
A measure that is to a certain extent the inverse (or mirror image) of the grant 
dependency ratio is the tax coverage ratio. This ratio provides an indication of an 
SNG’s ability to finance the activities imposed on it by the relevant acts and the 
Constitution of South Africa by means of own revenue resources. The ratio reflects 
tax effort, which may be equal to or less than the tax capacity, given the tax authority. 
Again, an increasing trend shows decreasing centralisation, or improved fiscal 
autonomy. 
The same centralisation trend as in Figure 2 is now shown in Figure 3 in the 
form of a declining provincial and local government tax coverage ratio. Although the 
overall levels of the provincial tax coverage ratio are higher when the TBVC states 
are included in the 1973 to 1994 period, the overall trend remains the same, with the 
value reaching a rather low level of only 2.18% in 2011. This means that provinces in 
South Africa could only cover 2.18% of their current expenditure from own revenue.8
1
Source: Own calculations based on SARB (1991) and SARB Quarterly Bulletin data
Figure 3:  Tax coverage ratio: tax revenue as a percentage of total expenditure, by type of sub-
national government (1973–1990, 1992–2011)
1Local government could cover about 50% of its current expenditure from own 
revenues at the beginning of the period under consideration. However, the tax 
coverage ratio declined to less than 17% by 2011.9 Interestingly, the tax coverage ratio 
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for local government also reveals that growth in local government expenditure has 
accelerated at a much faster pace than growth in own tax revenue. It is obvious that if 
this trend continues, local government’s fiscal autonomy will be reduced even more 
in future.
1
Source: Own calculations based on SARB (1991) and SARB Quarterly Bulletin data 
Figure 4:  Tax-wage coverage ratio: wage expenditure as a percentage of own tax revenue, by type 
of sub-national government (1992–2011)
1The trend of the tax-wage coverage ratio is shown in Figure 4. It shows that provinces 
in South Africa can foot less than 3.5% of their 2011 wage bill, which implies that 
96.5% of all provincial employees’ wages are de facto paid for by national government. 
Provincial government discretion is further eroded by the fact that the levels of and 
periodic adjustment in remuneration of provincial employees (which averaged 58% 
of provincial operating expenses from 1996) are determined as part and parcel of 
the wage negotiation process between national government and the labour unions. 
Local government fares better where tax-wage coverage is concerned, covering almost 
60% of its wages with own taxes. However, the overall trend for local government is 
declining in this regard.
In summary, the indicators show that sub-national government faced increased 
fiscal centralisation for the period 1973 to 2011. There can be little doubt that provincial 
governments have been greatly centralised, rendering them de facto administrative 
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offices of national government. Increased fiscal centralisation also holds for local 
government, but less than for provincial government. With regard to both provincial 
and local government, however, the unfunded mandate, defined as the difference 
between the cost of delivering on their constitutional mandate and the constitutional 
revenue sources, is growing. It might be argued that this is an excessively narrow 
definition of the unfunded mandate, because the Constitution provides for a share 
of provincial and local government in revenue collected nationally. The narrow 
definition is appropriate, however, as an indicator of independent ability.
Conclusions
1The South African fiscal scene has over many decades been characterised by a steady 
and gradual reduction of the fiscal autonomy of sub-national governments, which 
continued after 1994 despite the federal constitution. This paper found evidence of 
this by investigating the trend in fiscal autonomy with regard to various legislative, 
policy and operational measures between 1973 and 2011, as well as a number of 
indicators of fiscal (de)centralisation.
Although the implications of this trend are not discussed here, the literature 
suggests that increasing fiscal centralisation poses a threat to the allocative and 
technical efficiency of public services and the development of democracy in South 
Africa. South Africa may therefore well be heading towards a state that may be 
described either as a highly centralised federal state – to use Libman’s (2009) ironic 
characterisation of the Russian federation – or as a unitary state with “delegated” 
responsibility to provinces and a measure of decentralisation at local level. Whatever 
the description, the outcome seems to be de facto fiscal centralisation, which deviates 
from the de jure South African Constitution of 1994, and a continuation after 1994 of 
the historical trend towards increased fiscal centralisation.
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Endnotes
1.  This review may well have been borne out of growing doubts within the African Na-
tional Congress (ANC) government about the continued existence of provinces. Such 
doubts are not new. At the time of the Great Depression (1929–1933), the usefulness 
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and continued existence of the provincial system was also in doubt. Van Waasdijk (1964: 
213–214) points out that the co-existence in the provincial system “of a fair degree of 
political autonomy with a great measure of financial dependence made many wonder 
whether provinces were really viable”. How this type of doubt is dealt with results in the 
strengthening of either the unitary or the federalist route.
2.  Much work has been done on the implications and efficiency impacts of fiscal centrali-
sation and new research, particularly second and third generation fiscal centralisation 
theory – see, for instance, Oates (2005) and Vo (2010), who provides more support for 
a positive efficiency impact of centralisation. We note, however, that the focus of this 
paper is to determine the fiscal centralisation trend in South Africa, not its impact.
3.  The principle of subsidiarity is linked to the Bishop of Mainz, Emmanuel von Ketteler 
(1811–1877), according to whom government should undertake only those initiatives 
which exceed the capacity of individuals or private groups acting independently. Func-
tions of government, business and other secular activities should be as local as possible. 
In response to a request in 2003 by the UN Governing Council, the Advisory Group 
of Experts on Decentralisation drafted a Framework of Guidelines for Decentralisation 
and the Strengthening of Local Authorities. This report actually supported the subsid-
iarity principle, which was remarkable “given the fact that subsidiarity is recognised to 
go far beyond mere decentralisation” (Hoffschulte 2008: 118).
4. Other authors, such as Ebel and Yilmaz (2002), Zhang and Zou (2001) and Abachi and 
Salamatu (2012), make similar use of the definitions as Stegarescu (2005).
5. This is not a new phenomenon. Van Waasdijk (1964: 108), writing about local authori-
ties in South Africa, comments as follows: “Superior government authorities have never 
been very generous in their aid to municipalities, councils and area boards, although 
they have not hesitated at times to allocate to them an increasing burden of civic re-
sponsibility.”
6. In the 2010/11 financial year, only 13 of the 283 municipalities received clean audits, 
the most recent evidence of poor financial management at the third tier of government 
(Auditor-General 2012).
7. The TBVC states had six tax revenue categories according to the SARB (1991), name-
ly (i) taxes on net income and profits, (ii) taxes on property, (iii) taxes on goods and 
services, (iv) taxes on international trade and transactions, (v) employer's payroll and 
manpower taxes and (vi) other taxes.
8. The non-tax part of own revenue is so small that one can safely interpret the tax cover-
age ratio in this wider sense.
9. In the case of local government, the difference between tax and total own revenue is 
bigger than for provinces; we therefore retain the distinction.
Fiscal centralisation in a federal state: the South African case
151 
References 
Abachi, T.P. & Salamatu, I. 2012. ‘An analysis of the effect of fiscal decentralisation on 
economic growth in Nigeria’, International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 
2(8): 141–149.
Ajam, T. 2011. ‘Fiscal federalism’, In Black, P.A., Calitz, E. & Steenekamp, T.J. (Eds), Public 
Economics (5th edition). Cape Town: Oxford University Press.
Ajam, T. & Aron, J. 2007. ‘Fiscal renaissance in a democratic South Africa’, Journal of African 
Economies, 16(5): 745–781.
Auditor-General. 2012. Consolidated general report on the audit outcomes of local govern-
ment 2010–11. Available at http://www.agsa.co.za/Consolidated/index.html#/10/. 
Accessed: 3 August 2012.
Brown, L. 2007. Budget Speech for the 2007/08 financial year by the Western Cape Minister 
of Finance and Tourism, delivered on 6 March 2007. [Online] Available at: http://www.
polity.org.za/article/brown-western-cape-prov-budget-200708-06032007-2007-03-06. 
Accessed: 20 April 2012.
Browne, C.W.G. 1983. ‘Fifty years of public finance’, South African Journal of Economics, 
51(1): 134–173.
Calitz, E., Du Plessis, S.A. & Siebrits, F.K. 2009. ‘Institutions and the sustainability of fiscal 
policy in South Africa 1960–2008’, Paper delivered at the 15th World Economic History 
Congress, Utrecht, 3–7 August 2009.
De Clerck, S. 2003. ‘A note on the revision of the government finance statistics framework’, 
SARB Quarterly Bulletin, September 2003. 
De Villiers, B. 2008a. ‘Constitutional change: adapting without losing the roots’, In De 
Villiers, B. (Ed.). 2008b. Review of Provinces and Local Governments in South Africa: 
Constitutional Foundations and Practice. Konrad Adenhauer Stiftung Occasional Papers, 
Johannesburg.
De Villiers, B. (Ed.) 2008b. Review of Provinces and Local Governments in South Africa: 
Constitutional Foundations and Practice, Konrad Adenhauer Stiftung Occasional Papers. 
Johannesburg. 
Ebel, R. & Yilmaz, S. 2002. Concept of Fiscal Decentralisation and Worldwide Overview. 
Washington, DC: World Bank Institute.
Ehdaie, J. 1994. Fiscal Decentralization and the Size of Government, Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 1387. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Fessha, Y. & Kirkby, C. 2008. ‘A critical survey of subnational autonomy in African states’, 
Publius, 38(2): 248–271.
Garrett, G. & Rodden, J. 2001. ‘Globalization and fiscal decentralization’, Paper prepared 
for Conference on Globalization and Governance, Grande Colonial Hotel, La Jolla, 
CA, 30–31 March 2001. [Online] Available at: http://www. international.ucla.edu/cms/
files/globdec.pdf.  Accessed: 10 June 2009.
Hoffschulte, H. 2008. ‘The UN guidelines on decentralization and the strengthening of local 
authorities’, In De Villiers, B. (Ed.). 2008b. Review of Provinces and Local Governments 
E. Calitz & H. Essop
152
in South Africa: Constitutional Foundations and Practice, Konrad Adenhauer Stiftung 
Occasional Papers. Johannesburg.
Libman, A. 2009. Constitutions, Regulations, and Taxes: Contradictions of Different Aspects of 
Decentralization, Discussion Paper No. 58, University of Mannheim Centre for Doctoral 
Studies in Economics. [Online] Available at: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15854/. 
Accessed: 16 July 2009.
Malherbe, R. 2008a. ‘The constitutional distribution of powers ’, In De Villiers, B. (Ed.). 
2008b. Review of Provinces and Local Governments in South Africa: Constitutional 
Foundations and Practice, Konrad Adenhauer Stiftung Occasional Papers. Johannesburg.
Malherbe, R. 2008b. ‘The future of the provinces: Constitutional and structural aspects’, In 
De Villiers, B. (Ed.). 2008b. Review of Provinces and Local Governments in South Africa: 
Constitutional Foundations and Practice, Konrad Adenhauer Stiftung Occasional Papers. 
Johannesburg. 
Meloche, J-P., Vaillancourt, F. & Yilmaz, S. 2004. Decentralization or Fiscal Autonomy? What 
Does Really Matter? Effects on Growth and Public Sector Size in European Transition 
Countries. Policy Research Working Paper No. 3254. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Musgrave, R.A. 1983. ‘Who should tax, where and what?’, In McLure, C. (Ed.), Tax 
Assignment in Federal Countries. Canberra: Centre for Research on Federal Financial 
Relations, Australian National University.
National Treasury. 2008. 2008 Budget Review: Pretoria: National Treasury. [Online] 
Available at: http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2008/review/
chap4.pdf. Accessed: 8 June 2012.
National Treasury. 2011. Local government budgets and expenditure review: 2006/07–
2012/13. Pretoria. Available at http://www.finance.gov.za/publications/ igfr/2008/lg/
default.aspx/. Accessed: 29 August 2009.
Oates, W.E. 1972. Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Oates, W.E. 1977. The Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism. Lexington, MA: Lexington 
Books.
Oates, W.E. 2005. ‘Towards a second generation of fiscal federalism’, International Tax and 
Public Finance, 12, 349–373.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development). 1999. Taxing Powers of 
State and Local Government, OECD Tax Policy Studies No. 1. Paris: OECD.
Panizza, U. 1999. ‘On the determinants of fiscal centralization: theory and evidence’, 
Journal of Public Economics, 74: 97–139.
RSA (Republic of South Africa). 1996. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Act 106 
of 1996. Pretoria: Government Printer. [Online] Available at: http://www.info.gov.za/
documents/constitution/1996/a108-96.pdf. Accessed: 8 June 2009.
RSA (Republic of South Africa). 1998. White Paper on Local Government 1998. Pretoria: 
Department of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development.
SARB (South African Reserve Bank). 1991. South Africa’s Public-sector Accounts 1973 to 
1990, SARB Occasional Paper No. 4, July 1991.
Fiscal centralisation in a federal state: the South African case
153 
SARB (South African Reserve Bank). Various issues. Quarterly Bulletin. [Online] Available 
at: http://www.resbank.co.za/. 
Schneider, A. 2003. ‘Decentralization: conceptualization and measurement’, Studies in 
Comparative International Development, 38(3): 32–56.
Schoeman, N. 2006. ‘Rethinking fiscal decentralisation in South Africa’, Journal of Public 
Administration, 41(2): 110–127.
Shah, A. 2005. Fiscal Decentralization and Fiscal Performance, Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 3786. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Smoke, P. 2000. ‘Fiscal decentralization in East and Southern Africa: a selective review of 
experience and thoughts on moving forward’, Paper prepared for Conference on Fiscal 
Decentralization, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, 20–21 November 
2000. [Online] Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/2000/fiscal/
smoke.pdf. Accessed: 15 July 2009.
Stegarescu, D. 2005. ‘Public sector decentralization: measurement concepts and recent 
international trends’, Fiscal Studies, 26(3): 301–333.
Steytler, N. 2005. ‘Local government in South Africa: entrenching decentralised government’, 
In Steytler, N. (Ed.), The place and Role of Local Government in Federal Systems, Konrad 
Adenhauer Foundation Occasional Papers. Johannesburg.
Thornhill, C. 2008. ‘Local government after 15 years: issues and challenges’, In De 
Villiers, B. (Ed.). 2008b. Review of Provinces and Local Governments in South Africa: 
Constitutional Foundations and Practice, Konrad Adenhauer Stiftung Occasional Papers. 
Johannesburg.
Van den Heever, A. 2011. Evaluation of the green paper on national health insurance. 
Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand Graduate School of Public and 
Development Management. [Online] Available at: http://www.hsf.org.za/siteworkspace/
gp-review-alexvdh-dec2011-vf-1.pdf. Accessed: 8 June 2012.  
Van Waasdijk, T. 1964. Public Expenditure in South Africa: A Study of the Growth, Co-
ordination and Control of Budgets. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press.
Vo, D.H. 2010. ‘The economics of fiscal decentralization’, Journal of Economic Surveys, 
24(4): 657–679.
Zhang, X. 2006. ‘Fiscal decentralization and political centralization in China: implications 
for growth and inequality’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 34: 713–726.
Zhang, T. & Zou, H. 2001. ‘The growth impact of inter-sectoral and intergovernmental 
allocation of public expenditure: with applications to China and India’, China Economic 
Review, 12(1): 58–81.
E. Calitz & H. Essop
154
Annexure I:  Data series sources, codes and time periods
mlxvSeries name mlxviCode mlxviiPeriod
mlxviiiGovernment fi nance statistics of general government mlxixT419,S070,24 mlxx1992–2011
mlxxiCash receipts from operating activities  mlxxii4856F;A mlxxiii1992–2011
mlxxivCash receipts from operating activities: Taxes  mlxxv4857F;A mlxxvi1992–2011
mlxxviiCash receipts from operating activities: Social contributions  mlxxviii4858F;A mlxxix1992–2011
mlxxxCash receipts from operating activities: Grants  mlxxxi4859F;A mlxxxii1992–2011
mlxxxiiiCash receipts from operating activities: Other receipts  mlxxxiv4860F;A mlxxxv1992–2011
mlxxxviCash payments for operating activities mlxxxvii 4861F;A mlxxxviii1992–2011
mlxxxixCash payments for operating activities: Compensation of employees mxc4862F;A mxci1992–2011
mxciiGovernment fi nance statistics of provincial governments mxciiiT417,S068,24 mxciv1992–2011
mxcvCash receipts from operating activities  mxcvi4801F;A mxcvii1992–2011
mxcviiiCash receipts from operating activities: Taxes  mxcix4280F;A mc1992–2011
mciCash receipts from operating activities: Social contributions  mcii4802F;A mciii1992–2011
mcivCash receipts from operating activities: Grants  mcv4283F;A mcvi1992–2011
mcviiCash receipts from operating activities: Other receipts  mcviii4281F;A mcix1992–2011
mcxCash payments for operating activities mcxi4803F;A mcxii1992–2011
mcxiiiCash payments for operating activities: Compensation of employees mcxiv4804F;A mcxv1992–2011
mcxviGovernment fi nance statistics of local governments mcxviiT418,S06 9,24 mcxviii1992–2011
mcxixCash receipts from operating activities  mcxx4826F;A mcxxi1992–2011
mcxxiiCash receipts from operating activities: Taxes  mcxxiii4827F;A mcxxiv1992–2011
mcxxvCash receipts from operating activities: Social contributions  mcxxvi4828F;A mcxxvii1992–2011
mcxxviiiCash receipts from operating activities: Grants  mcxxix4829F;A mcxxx1992–2011
mcxxxiCash receipts from operating activities: Other receipts  mcxxxii4830F;A mcxxxiii1992–2011
mcxxxivCash payments for operating activities  mcxxxv4831F;A mcxxxvi1992–2011
mcxxxviiCash payments for operating activities: Compensation of employees mcxxxviii4832F;A mcxxxix1992–2011
mcxlTBVC and self-governing states mcxliGFS003 mcxlii1973–1990
mcxliiiTax revenue mcxlivSARB OP4 mcxlv1973–1990
mcxlviNon-tax revenue mcxlvii1973–1990
mcxlviiiGrants mcxlix1973–1990
mclTotal current expenditure mcli1973–1990
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mlxvSeries name mlxviCode mlxviiPeriod
mcliiProvincial government mcliiiGFS007 mcliv1973–1990
mclvTax revenue mclviSARB OP4 mclvii1973–1990
mclviiiNon-tax revenue mclix1973–1990
mclxGrants mclxi1973–1990
mclxiiTotal current expenditure mclxiii1973–1990
mclxivLocal government mclxvGFS008 mclxvi1973–1990
mclxviiTax revenue mclxviiiSARB OP4 mclxix1973–1990
mclxxNon-tax revenue mclxxi1973–1990
mclxxiiGrants mclxxiii1973–1990
mclxxivTotal current expenditure mclxxv1973–1990
mclxxviConsolidated general government mclxxviiGFS009 mclxxviii1973–1990
mclxxixTax revenue mclxxxSARB OP4 mclxxxi1973–1990
mclxxxiiNon-tax revenue mclxxxiii1973–1990
mclxxxivGrants mclxxxv1973–1990
mclxxxviTotal current expenditure mclxxxvii1973–1990
mclxxxviiiSource: Unless noted otherwise, data were drawn from the SARB Quarterly Bulletin. 
mclxxxixNote: 1. SARB OP4 refers to SARB Occasional Paper 4, cited as SARB (1991) herein. 
mcxc  2. Data as on 16 April 2012. Data for last two years (2010, 2011) are subject to revision.
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